Construction of Alabama’s Browns Ferry plant began in 1966, but regulators failed to resolve how new rules requiring physical separation of electrical cables should be implemented. AEC inspector F.U. Bower requested clarification, yet no instructions followed five failed inspections in 1970. The resulting cable-installation problems compromised safety-cooling systems in two units. On March 22, 1975, a candle used during an air-leak test ignited the wire-separating material and damaged control systems, leaving cooling equipment unable to function properly and creating a near-radiation-release scenario. A local firefighter’s request to use water helped extinguish the blaze, and the affected units were taken out of service.
During the crisis, engineer William P. Bridenbaugh had repeatedly raised safety reservations without success. Bridenbaugh and fellow General Electric nuclear engineers Hubbard and Minor resigned in 1976, later becoming industry consultants and testifying at congressional hearings. Their disclosures helped draw national attention to nuclear-power risks and influenced the public debate surrounding films such as The China Syndrome. The episode remains an example of regulatory inaction, design-control failures, and retaliation fears converging before a potentially catastrophic accident.
